When Xi Jinping sat down with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Beijing in November 2022, he publicly called on nations to oppose both the use and the threat of nuclear weapons. I was glad to hear it from a leader as close to Vladimir Putin as Xi. I take China’s warning seriously, and I take Putin’s threats seriously too.

I keep coming back to the fact that Xi objected to the threat itself. In October 2026, Putin again invoked Russia’s full arsenal, including nuclear weapons, in warning against an attack on Kaliningrad, the Russian territory between Poland and Lithuania. Every time he brings up those weapons, people far from the battlefield have to weigh his words against what they know the weapons can do. I resent the ease with which a man at a podium can make that calculation everyone else’s business.

I’d give particular weight to what Antony Blinken told the Financial Times in January 2025, while he was still U.S. secretary of state. Washington, he said, had reason to believe China had told Russia, “Don’t go there.” I find those three plain words more arresting than a page of diplomatic language. I also pay attention to Blinken’s careful phrasing. He was describing what Washington believed Beijing had said, and how much that message weighed in Putin’s thinking remains a matter of judgment.

I can see why Beijing would want to keep this war from going nuclear. In the same meeting with Scholz, Xi raised the need to protect supply chains and keep trade in energy and food from being disrupted. China buys Russian oil, coal, and gas and sells Russia goods ranging from cars to electronics. The two countries traded more than $228 billion in goods in 2025. That figure is a measure of how much Beijing has at stake. A nuclear escalation would put China’s business with the rest of the world at risk too.

I was equally struck by the warning from India. In October 2022, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh told his Russian counterpart, Sergei Shoigu, that any use of nuclear or radiological weapons would go against basic principles of humanity. China and India have both been major buyers of Russian crude since the invasion, so their objections carry weight in Moscow. How far either government would go to penalize Russia after a strike remains an open question. I’d put more stock in a consequence Beijing or New Delhi is prepared to spell out in advance.

What keeps me from declaring Putin’s threats empty is what he has put on paper. In November 2024, he approved a doctrine that widened the circumstances in which Russia could consider using nuclear weapons, including certain conventional attacks. A doctrine leaves room for judgment, and that is precisely where pressure from Beijing can matter. It can make a decision more costly for Putin. The decision itself still rests in Moscow.
When the conversation turns to oil cargoes and diplomatic friendships, I find myself thinking about the people in Ukraine who would bear the first and worst consequences of a strike there. They already live with a war that other governments discuss from the comfort of conference rooms. I want any diplomacy over nuclear threats to give Ukrainians a voice in decisions about their own safety. Their future is too important to be settled in a private exchange between Beijing and Moscow.

China’s foreign ministry reaffirmed its opposition to nuclear use and threats in April 2026. I’d like Xi to give that position more force by saying plainly what a nuclear strike would cost Russia in its dealings with China. India could make its own position equally clear. The time for Putin to hear what two of his biggest oil customers are prepared to do is while he still has every reason to step back.